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THE COLLISION OF EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL,
SECTION 1981 & GONZALEZ: DISCHARGE,
CONSENT AND CONTRACT SUFFICIENCY
Harry Hutchisont
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where
they please, and to discharge or retain employes [sic] at will for
good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby
being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an
employe [sic] may exercise in the same way, to the same extent,
for the same cause or want of cause as the employer.1
The simple characterisation [sic] of employment as a contract
fails to grasp the nature of the social relations involved. In the
first place, the ordinary nexus between manager and employee
cannot be described as a contractual relation, for they have never
2actually made a contract together.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, "the majority of
employment relationships in the United States have been governed by the
common law employment-at-will presumption."3 Commentators both in
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1. Payne v. W. & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other grounds
by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
2. Hugh Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, and the Contract of
Employment, 15 INDuS. L.J. 1, 3 (1986) [hereinafter Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic
Power].
3. John P. Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory Control of Termination
Decisions: A Case for the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal Requirements, 20 HARV. J.L.
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the United States and abroad argue that employment-at-will constitutes an
exercise of arbitrary power by individuals in dominant economic and/or
bureaucratic positions against workers, whose mobility may be limited.4
While a majority of jurisdictions recognize the common law doctrine of
employment-at-will 5 as a default rule6 that has evolved from a transnational
conception of the common law,7 it has arguably undergone substantial
erosion over the past three decades,8 consistent with the Anglo-American
& PuB. POL'Y 555, 556 (1997); see also Andrew P. Morriss, Developing A Framework for
Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the
Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 999, 1060 (1995) [hereinafter
Morriss, Developing A Framework] (stating that "[s]ince the end of the nineteenth century,
the default rule for the interpretation of indefinite employment contracts in the United States
has been employment-at-will"); Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and
Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO. L. REv. 679, 688 (1994)
[hereinafter Morriss, Exploding Myths] (noting that employment-at-will became the default
rule for interpreting individual contracts in the United States in the early part of the
twentieth century). For an excellent and penetrating discussion of at-will employment, see
DOUGLAS E. RAY, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 43-69 (1999).
4. See, e.g., Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 2, at 2 (arguing
that an employee's subordination stems from "inequality of bargaining power and the
exercise of bureaucratic power").
5. Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1049 n.ll
(5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the "overwhelming majority of states recognize the traditional
common law doctrine of employment-at-will").
6. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 105, 107 n.9
(1997) (noting that "[e]mployment at will is the default rule in every American jurisdiction
except Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands").
7. For an excellent survey of the development of the at-will doctrine, see Gail L.
Heriot, The New Feudalism: The Unintended Destination of Contemporary Trends in
Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REv. 167, 167-93 (1993). See also Morriss, Exploding Myths,
supra note 3, at 683-745 (tracing and analyzing the rise of employment-at-will in various
states). For a discussion of the employment contract and in particular the doctrine of
employment-at-will from a law and economics perspective, see Ian Ayres & Stewart
Schwab, The Employment Contract, 8 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 71 (1999).
8. See REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION: ESSENTIAL TERMS AND CONCEPTS 7-50 (1998) (discussing the contract and
tort erosion the at-will doctrine has faced in the past three decades). Increasingly, courts
have developed the following exceptions to the at-will rule: public policy exceptions,
employer liability for breaking either express or implied promises concerning discharge
policies, and an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which requires employment
contracts be interpreted in light of community standards of fair treatment. Id. at 13-50; see
also RAY ET AL., supra note 3, at 45-67 (discussing common law and legislative erosion of
the at-will doctrine); Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections In An At-Will
World, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1655, 1655 (1996) (noting that the at-will employment rule "has
been drastically cut back in the last sixty years"); Frantz, supra note 3, at 558 n.9 (noting
that the courts have developed three exceptions to the at-will employment rule); Morriss,
Exploding Myths, supra note 3, at 682 (noting that "all but two states courts had limited
employment at-will in a significant fashion by 1993"). For a discussion of an emerging
challenge to the at-will presumption in the form of the evolution of a communitarian
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conclusion9 that the balance of power has shifted "heavily in favor of direct
public regulation."' ° For some, this hauntingly appealing erosion confirms
a growing consensus among legislatures and judges that restrictions should
be placed on an employer's right to terminate the employment
relationship." Similarly, others suggest that given that contracts of
employment, like most contracts, "engender relations of power,"' 2 and
given that the assent required to produce such contracts arises out of an
inequality of bargaining power13 (both bureaucratic and economic), at-will
employment should be placed under review. For several observers then,
employment-at-will continues to be "premised on antiquated notions of
economic individualism and contractual freedom"'14 and remains contrary to
the emerging consensus among major industrial countries.' 5 Accordingly,
the persistence of at-will employment in the United States reflects the fact
that workers are mistaken about the law and misled by their employers at
the time of hiring as to the risks of discharge. 6 This leads to the
perspective in the context of the United Kingdom, see Harry Hutchison, Evolution,
Consistency and Community: The Political, Social and Economic Assumptions That Govern
the Incorporation of Terms in British Employment Contracts, 25 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 335 (2000) [hereinafter Hutchison, Evolution, Consistency and Community].
9. See, e.g., Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 2, at 1-14
(discussing the unequal bargaining power of employers and employees).
10. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. Rav. 947, 947
(1984); see also Heriot, supra note 7, at 193-94 (discussing the trend toward government
regulation of the employment relationship).
11. See HANNER WHITE, supra note 8, at 7.
12. Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 2, at 1. For an examination
and analysis of these and other views, see Harry Hutchison, Subordinate or Independent,
Status or Contract, Clarity or Circularity: British Employment Law, American Implications
28 GA. J. INT"L & COMP. L. 55 (1999) [hereinafter Hutchison, Subordinate or Independent,
Status or Contract]; Hutchison, Evolution, Consistency and Community, supra note 8, at
335-58.
13. Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 2, at 1-3.
14. Frantz, supra note 3, at 556; see also Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal:
Enforcing A Statutory Guarantee, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 207, 207 (1983) (arguing that
the United States should adopt statutory guarantees of fair dismissal as other highly
industrialized nations have already done and proposing a system that would conform to
world standards of unfair dismissal); Lawrence Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLuM. L. REv. 1404,
1416 (1967) (arguing that the ancient notion of an employer's dominion over his employees
is "incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers"); Clyde W.
Summers, hdividual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REv. 481, 491 (1976) (arguing that there is inadequate statutory protection against unjust
dismissal of employees).
15. Summers, supra note 14, at 509-19 (surveying the protection against unjust
dismissal in various European nations).
16. See Kim, supra note 6, at 110 (noting that critics of at-will employment believe that
employees often have inadequate information and are likely misled by their employers). But
see Morriss, Developing A Framework, supra note 3, at 1060 n.225 (stating that some
commentators argue that employees tend to misunderstand their employer's obligations with
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conclusion that inflated expectations prevent employees from recognizing
the value of job security guarantees.17 While these claims may be
questionable, the underlying premise is widely accepted by critics of the at-
will rule.
18
On the other hand, if one accepts the view that "any employment
relationship is a contractual one, based on mutual consent," 19 then freedom
of contract for employers and employees both advances individual
autonomy and promotes the efficient operation of labor markets. 20 The
wisdom of this view may or may not be confirmed by the fact that
alternatives to at-will employment have not yet infiltrated this form of
employment; employment-at-will still remains the predominant form of
labor contracts in the United States.1 Under this model the worker can quit
when he or she wants to and subject to some exceptions, the employer can
terminate him or her for any or no reason. While there may be reason to
doubt the value of this type of employment relationship,22 it is equally
respect to discharge). It is possible that historically:
the employment relation was conceived as generally having three dominant
characteristics. First, it was a personal relationship between a dominant master
or employer and a servient worker. Second, it was full-time, meaning that it
was for the full normal work week. Third, it was generally assumed to continue
for a substantial period.
Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 503,
503 (1997). See also Hutchison, Subordinate or Independent, Status or Contract, supra
note 12, at 56-57 (discussing the distinction between a "contract for service" and a "contract
of service" and its importance for determining whether an employment relationship exists
under British law).
17. Kim, supra note 6, at 110 (stating that some commentators believe that the various
discharge restrictions that the law places on employers engenders a false sense of job
security in employees).
18. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 6, at 107-08 (discussing the perceived unfairness of the
at-will rule, the lack of support for this rule among other industrialized countries, and its
incompatibility with modem, contemporary and humane values); see also Blades, supra
note 14, at 1405-10 (arguing that the employment relationship is unbalanced and destroys
the freedom of the employees).
19. Heriot, supra note 7, at 167. In addition to a consent-based theory of contract, other
variations include the notion that a contract reflects a promise. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED,
CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 7-27 (1981) (arguing that
the promise principle is the moral basis of a contract).
20. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 951 (arguing that the widely held view that
employment-at-will has outlived its usefulness is mistaken).
21. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw, 358 (1998) (stating that
"employment at will is the usual form of labor contract in the United States").
22. See, e.g., John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing
Concept of Employment-at-Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 491 (1980) (examining recent trends
in at-will employment and noting a growing unrest with the prevalent common law tradition
of employment-at-will); Gary Minda, The Common Law of Employment At-Will in New
York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939, 989 (1985)
(criticizing the New York rule known as "Wood's Rule" which preserves employment-at-
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doubtful that such workers are without any protection at all.23 Posner has
argued that "[i]f the employer gets a reputation for arbitrarily discharging
employees, he will have to pay new employees a premium. Since the
employer thus cannot gain in the long run from a policy of arbitrary
discharges-it is not effective predatory behavior-he might as well treat
the employee fairly. 2 4  Moreover, limits on employee dismissal by
management may add "a degree of rigidity to a relationship that had
previously been very flexible." '
Much ink has been spilt both attacking and defending the
employment-at-will doctrine. Frequently, the debate centers on direct
threats in the form of statutory control over employer termination authority,
or on judicial decisions which seek to overturn adherence to this doctrine
on the ground that it represents an antiquated concept, or on arguments for
26intervention grounded in the notion of unequal bargaining power. While
the validity of these assaults may be doubtful,27 alternative ways have been
found to constrain the employment-at-will doctrine. Among them are
various statutory enactments which govern employment terms (i.e.,
minimum wages and fair labor standards) and grounds for discharge (i.e.,
anti-discrimination statutes and public policy exceptions). It has been
asserted that while "discrimination law makes only a limited formal
incursion on employment at will, it arguably does impinge more
significantly in an informal way. Employers who are sued under a federal
discrimination statute have their best chance of winning if they can offer a
good reason for their adverse employment actions.""
will absent any statutory protection against dismissal); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges
from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7-8 (1979) (arguing
that the current at-will employment system in the United States is not consistent with a
civilized society). But see, e.g., Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 3, at 762-63
(defending the at-will rule as "a solution to an institutional problem which remains
important today").
23. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 358-59 (arguing that employees have some job
security as they develop firm-specific skills that make them more productive).
24. Id. at 358.
25. Heriot, supra note 7, at 194.
26. Two leading commentators have discussed, from an economic perspective, and
dismissed the inequality of bargaining power argument as a basis for government
intervention. See Ayres & Schwab, supra note 7, at 74-76 (discussing the issue of unequal
bargaining power as a context for legal intervention in the employment market).
27. For a recent assessment of some of the arguments for and against employment at-
will from a law and economics perspective, see Ayres & Schwab, supra note 7, at 71-83
(arguing that at-will employment lessens opportunism by employers and employees and the
inequality of bargaining power argument fails to explain the fact that most employment
relationships are at-will).
28. William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of Summers, The Rise of "Pretext Plus," and The
Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at
Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305, 330 (1996). Courts might be
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One observer provides this assessment of the contours of this dispute:
"On one side are power, property, and prerogative-the ultimate
manifestation of which is the legal doctrine known as employment at will.
On the other side are the federal statutes and policies prohibiting
discrimination in employment based on specified invidious
characteristics."29 While it is far from crystalline that such commentary
amounts to a balanced appraisal," it is unmistakable that employment-at-
will is often referred to as a "feudal concept."3 ' And yet, "it is difficult to
imagine a more inapt comparison than that between feudal vassalage and
employment at will.
3 2 Whatever it is, simple or complex, right or wrong,
33
employment-at-will can be perceived as a particular type of transaction:
[T]he employee trades labor for wages; the employee allows an
employer to control his or her activities during working hours in
return for cold, hard cash. In that respect, the relationship is
indistinguishable from any other market transaction-an exchange
of goods or services freely entered into by the parties and nothing
else.34
Given its rather maligned reputation, however, one might have
predicted that employment-at-will would be overmatched when arrayed
against positive statutory law enacted by Congress.35 While that might be a
suspicious of an employer's claim that it did not discriminate when it offers no reason for its
action. Additionally, in cases where employers offer bad but not discriminatory reasons,
they may not be believed. Id. at 330 (citing RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 148 (1992)).
29. Corbett, supra note 28, at 307.
30. While management prerogative may be an explanatory factor for discrimination, it
is possible that Corbett's hegemonic concern for managerial prerogative is misplaced given
the persistent attempts of some unions to exclude racial minorities from the workplace and
the willingness of some union leaders to ignore the concerns of minorities. For an
examination of the evidence drawn from the United States and South Africa, see Harry
Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception of Minimum Wage Regimes:
Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy and Hierarchy, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 93, 128-29
(1997). For a discussion of the capability of some union leaders and majorities to ignore the
concerns of racial minorities in the postmodem world, see Harry Hutchison, Reclaiming the
Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Postmodern Perspective in the Mirror of Public
Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM (forthcoming October 2000). For a discussion of
the common law tradition which recognizes that employers possess managerial prerogative
powers beyond the scope of the express term of the contract, see Harry Hutchison,
Evolution, Consistency, and Community, supra note 8, at 340.
31. Heriot, supra note 7, at 167 (citing Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551
(N.H. 1974) (stating that the common-law rule of employment-at-will is based on the
ancient feudal system)).
32. Id.
33. See generally Estlund, supra note 8, at 1691 (arguing that employment-at-will
undermines the effectiveness of important public policies).
34. Heriot, supra note 7, at 168.
35. Corbett, supra note 28, at 308 ("In the beginning, one might have predicted that
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hasty conclusion, and while there may be elegant arguments for the
economic efficiency of at-will employment, 6 the focus of this article is not
whether at-will employment deserves to be assailed or safeguarded in some
normative sense or whether the cacophonous voices illuminate or
dissemble, but whether § 1981 applies or should apply to at-will
relationships grounded in the notion of contract. A related question is
whether employment-at-will, if considered a contract, embodies
satisfactory contractual sufficiency to sustain a § 1981 claim. This issue is
most poignantly illustrated in the context of a contested discharge. For
example, can termination be characterized as a term of the contract
(assuming one exists) or is it merely a default rule, which cannot logically
be sustained as a term of the employment agreement by individuals and
courts that are committed to the notion of a contract premised on grounds
of consent? More specifically, do workers possess adequate knowledge
about this asserted default rule and, if not, will the absence of knowledge
negate the assertion that the term of employment is within the contract, and
thus, alterable by § 1981? Answers to these questions raise ineffably
ornery and potentially irresolvable doctrinal issues that may paralyze the
application of § 1981 in some at-will situations.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit entered this doctrinal fray with dicta that
confronts, but does not decide, these related questions.3 7 While an incipient
dispute has arguably developed regarding the reach and application of §
1981 to at-will employment, the operation of § 1981 should conceptually
38turn on state law. Accordingly, federal courts will have to decide whether
§ 1981 applies, or should apply, within the context of a given state's
jurisdiction. Significantly, Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. held
that in order to bring a § 1981 claim "there must at least be a contract.
'"3 9
employment at will . . . would be overmatched when opposing the employment
discrimination statutes, which are positive law enacted by Congress.").
36. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 955-76 (arguing that employment-at-will is
economically efficient).
37. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1998)
(indicating that an employment-at-will relationship will not sustain a § 1981 claim, but
deciding the case on other grounds under Illinois law).
38. For example, in Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d
1048 (5th Cir. 1998), the federal appeals court relied on decisions derived from Sabine Pilot
Service, hzc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). Sabine suggests that while an at-will
employee can be fired for good, bad, or no cause, he or she cannot be fired for an illicit
cause. Perforce, the Fadeyi court held that discrimination on the basis of race is not only
illegal but against public policy, and therefore, an employee states a cause of action under §
1981 even if he or she is an at-will employee. See Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1051-52. But see
Mungin v. Macklowe, No. 97 Civ. 6058, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *6-*7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2000) (finding that an at-will employee cannot maintain a cause of action under §
1981).
39. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034.
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And yet, even if an at-will relationship can be considered a contract under
40pertinent state law, it may nonetheless provide an insufficient contractual
relationship to support a § 1981 claim.41  Since Gonzalez, several other
circuits have taken up the mantle.42 Three federal circuits have issued
decisions which confirm that at-will employment provides an adequate
basis to sustain a § 1981 action. On the other hand, a distinct split of
opinion has emerged within the Second Circuit. A majority of courts in the
Southern District of New York have held that employment-at-will is not a
contract pursuant to New York state law.43 By contrast, a minority of
courts in the Southern District have held that, "while an at-will employee
may not have a per se contract with his employer, he may have a
contractual relationship with the employer for purposes of Section 198 1."4
The Second Circuit is in the process of settling a dispute among the district
courts premised on whether, under state law, at-will employment is a
contract at all within the meaning of § 1981 45 Although an earlier Second
Circuit case confirmed that a § 1981 plaintiff "must show both that he was
subjected to intentional discrimination.., and that this discrimination
interfered with a contractual relationship, 46 the meaning of a contract for
the purpose of § 1981 has been placed squarely in issue by the surging
dispute within this and other jurisdictions.
40. McKnight v. Gen. Motors, Inc., 908 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
while a contract at-will may end abruptly, it is a real and continuing contract, not a series of
contracts).
41. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034. Confusingly, other courts assert that while
employment-at-will is not a per se contract, it does possess satisfactory contractual
sufficiency for a § 1981 claim. See, e.g., Mungin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *3-*4.
42. See, e.g, Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that an
at-will employment relationship is a contract under New Mexico law); Spriggs v. Diamond
Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that employment-at-will is
considered a contractual relationship and may, therefore, serve as a predicate for § 1981
claims); Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1050 (stating that an at-will employment relationship is a
contract under Texas law).
43. See, e.g., Mungin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *6 (holding that an at-will
employee cannot maintain a cause of action under § 1981); Lauture v. IBM, No. 98 Civ.
4882, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20637, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999) (holding that an
employee at-will cannot sue for wrongful discharge under § 1981(a), as amended); Bascomb
v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8747, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 353, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
15, 1999) (holding that employment-at-will is noncontractual and therefore an at-will
employee cannot state a claim under § 1981); Brown v. Sara Lee Corp., No. 98 Civ. 1593,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18325, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (stating that the contract
clause of § 1981 does not apply to at-will employees).
44. Mungin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *3-*5.
45. Lauture, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20637, at *2-*3.
46. Krulik v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 781 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Murray v.
Nat'l Broad. Co., 844 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that to maintain a cause of
action under § 1981, a plaintiff must show intentional discrimination that interfered with the
contractual relationship).
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While most other circuits have yet to confront this question directly,
the Gonzalez opinion, and other federal court decisions, are of considerable
importance because they occur against a background that includes the
highly criticized decision of the United States Supreme Court in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union,47 as well as Congressional efforts to overturn that
48decision. Section 1981, part of a series of post-civil war statutes,
"prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
contracts., 49  Patterson restricted the application of § 1981 to contract
formation and enforcement issues and thus prohibits its application to terms
and conditions. For some observers, this decision contributes to a long
lineage that is rooted in the Court's "powerlessness to control employment
at will."50 On the other hand, the 1991 Civil Rights Act evinces a
Congressional desire to substantiate and expand the application of § 1981
beyond the constraints imposed by the Supreme Court. Today, § 1981's
proscriptions include "discrimination in the performance, modification, and
termination of the contract, as well as in the benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of the contractual relationship."" Significantly, it applies both
to "public and private discrimination. 5 2 Section 1981 can be a powerful
tool for fighting intentional racial discrimination in employment, 53
especially when Title VII is inapplicable.54 However powerful, § 1981, like
the law generally, may be a rather weak instrument that is incapable of
permanently resolving racial problems in society.55
I hope to illustrate that while the 1991 Civil Rights Act broadens the
reach of § 1981, an important predicate remains: there must be both a
contract and a sufficient contractual relationship to sustain a claim.
Without an underlying contract or a sufficient contractual relationship, §
1981 remains impotent in the face of alleged discriminatory misconduct.
47. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
48. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991) (originally enacted as Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144) (securing equal rights to make and enforce contracts).
49. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
50. Corbett, supra note 28, at 353.
51. HANNERWHITE, supra note 8, at 115.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 116. Section 1981 only embraces claims of intentional discrimination and
accordingly, the disparate impact theory remains unavailable. Id. It also extends to all
contracts, not simply employment contracts. Id. at 115. In contradistinction with Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 entitles the plaintiff to
plenary compensatory damages as well as punitive damages in an appropriate case.
54. Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. §
2000-e(b) (1991).
55. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act:
The "Impossibility" of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 967 (1993) (arguing
that the failure of civil rights statutes to address the "race question" hinders reform through
judicial channels).
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Employers thus have one pertinent and potentially devastating defense to
employee claims: the absence of a contract or a contract term that can be
altered by § 1981. Indeed, the significance of this issue may extend beyond
the parameters of § 1981 and may implicate Title VII claims as well.56
Before considering the current state of the debate among the several
circuits, Part II examines the Patterson decision, the statutory amendments
to § 1981 derived from the 1991 Civil Rights Act, and a relatively early
Seventh Circuit opinion. Part Ell examines the Gonzalez decision, a
number of recent federal appellate cases, and a few cases from New York
that have shaped the debate in the Second Circuit. Part IV analyzes
selected arguments generated by both supporters and opponents of
employment-at-will. I intend to demonstrate that the analyses used by
freedom of contract advocates and employment-at-will critics may
converge to exacerbate difficult doctrinal issues connected with the
presumed application of the at-will canon as a default rule.
Relying primarily on the teaching of case law and doctrinal concerns,
I reach the tentative conclusion that § 1981 does apply, and should apply,
to at-will relationships despite potentially vigorous arguments to the
contrary spawned by the notion of consent. In reaching this conclusion, I
assert that while employment-at-will is an indefinite form of employment,
it should nonetheless be seen as a contract. Throughout this discussion, I
will largely concentrate on the identification of the law through
conventional criteria as opposed to delving into a moral evaluation directed
57at normative concerns.
1I. PATTERSON V. MCLEAN CREDiT UNION AND THE 1991 CIvIL RIGHTS
ACT
A. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union
Prior to the enactment of Congressional amendments, Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union"8 restricted the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. While the
plaintiff proffered a number of allegations, the most pertinent issues
56. It might be possible for employers to argue that Title VII's protection of the terms
and conditions of employment fail to apply to at-will employment relationships. See Letter
from Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law 4 (Dec. 16, 1999) (on file at 1401
New York Avenue, NW, Suite 400, Washington DC 20005-0400) (citing Hishon v. King &
Spalding, Inc., 467 U.S. 69 (1984)).
57. This approach has been described as part of H.L.A. Hart's rule of recognition. See,
e.g., BRIAN Bix, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 36-37 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that
Hart's rule of recognition is premised on determining which rules are part of our legal
system).
58. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
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involved the application of § 1981 to her lawsuit. The employer laid off
the petitioner, Brenda Patterson, a black woman.5 9 After termination, she
commenced an action in federal court and alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 because her employer had: (1) harassed her; (2) failed to promote
her to an intermediate accounting clerk position; and (3) then discharged
her because of her race.60 The petitioner also claimed that this conduct
amounted to an intentional infliction of emotional distress and, therefore,
was actionable under North Carolina tort law.61
According to the Supreme Court, § 1981 includes two pertinent
elements. The "most obvious feature of [§ 1981] is the restriction of its
scope to forbidding discrimination in the 'mak[ing] and enforce[ment]' of
contracts alone. Where an alleged act of discrimination does not involve
the impairment of one of these specific rights, § 1981 provides no relief.
' 62
Thus, "[s]ection 1981 cannot be construed as a general proscription of
racial discrimination in all aspects of contract relations, for it expressly
prohibits discrimination only in the making and enforcement of
contracts."" Hence, by its terms, the statute does not extend to post-
formation problems arising out of continuing employment, including the
conduct of the employer in breaching contract terms, the imposition of
discriminatory working conditions, or discharge. Such behavior does not
implicate the "right to make" a contract but the performance of established
contractual obligations.64 Second, the guarantee that blacks enjoy "the
same right.., to... enforce contracts... as is enjoyed by white citizens"
encompasses "protection of a legal process, and of a right of access to legal
process, that will address and resolve contract-law claims without regard to
race."65  This provision protects access to courts and prevents
discrimination which would infect the legal process and preclude an
66employee from enforcing a contract right because of her race. While this
proscription applies to both public and wholly private efforts to impede
access to courts, 67 it does not extend beyond conduct by an employer which
impairs an employee's ability to enforce established contract rights through
61the legal process.
Since the plaintiffs complaint attacked the conditions of her
employment (racial harassment) she could not succeed unless: (1) the court
59. Id. at 169.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 169.
62. Id. at 176.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 177.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 177-78.
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could be persuaded that the language of § 1981 compels the court "to look
outside section 1981 to the terms of particular contracts and to state law for
the obligations and covenants to be protected by the federal statute ''6 9 or (2)
"the acts constituting harassment are sufficiently severe or pervasive as
effectively to belie any claim that the contract was entered into in a racially
neutral manner. 70  The Court declined to accept either broadened
interpretation.7' Therefore, the only questions that remained were whether
the employer refused to enter into an employment contract because of
racial animus or whether the victim was denied her contract rights because
of race. While racial harassment, like other post-formation conduct, is
actionable under Title VII's proscriptions against discrimination in the
terms, conditions or privileges of employment, "racial harassment relating
to the conditions of employment is not actionable under § 1981 because
that provision does not apply to conduct which occurs after the formation
of a contract and which does not interfere with the right to enforce
established contract obligations. 7 2 The Court thus rejected the opportunity
to construe § 1981 "as a general proscription of racial discrimination in all
aspects of contract relations.73
On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court conceded the
possibility that discrimination with respect to a promotion may give rise to
an actionable claim if the nature of the promotion involves the opportunity
to enter into a new contract with the employer.74 Thus, § 1981 provides a
basis for an actionable claim when there is an alleged discriminatory
promotion and the promotion creates a new and distinct relationship
between the employer and the employee.75 Accordingly, Brenda Patterson
69. Id. at 182. In arguing that the Supreme Court should look outside the language of §
1981, the Solicitor General implied that the statute has no actual substantive content, but
instead mirrored only the specific protections that were afforded under the law of contracts
of each state. If this view was accepted, racial harassment in the conditions of employment
becomes actionable only when it amounts to a breach of contract under state law. The Court
declined such a construction because racial harassment amounting to a breach, like racial
harassment alone, impairs neither the right to make nor the right to enforce a contract. Id. at
182-83.
70. Id. at 184. The Supreme Court declined Justice Brennan's proffered standard. Id.
71. See id. at 182-85.
72. Id. at 171.
73. Id. at 176.
74. Id. at 185.
75. See id. at 185-86. One issue considered was the soundness of the district court's
jury instruction. In cases of alleged disparate treatment, the ultimate issue is whether the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. The district court erred in its
formulation requiring the plaintiff to prove that she was more qualified than the white
employee who received the promotion. The correct order is that the plaintiff need only
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she applied for and was qualified for an
available position for which she was rejected, and that after she was rejected the defendant
either continued to seek applicants for the position, or filled the position with a white
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may have an actionable claim premised on her failure to be promoted.
While even the Patterson Court "implicitly conceded that an at-will
employee may maintain a cause of action under § 198 1,06 it has been
forcefully maintained that the Supreme Court engaged in a "needlessly
cramped interpretation" of the statute.77 This decision is, therefore, seen as
a parsimonious reading of a civil rights statute which fails "to further our
Nation's commitment to the eradication of racial discrimination. '  The
dissent would accordingly allow the racial harassment claim79 and would
decline to constrain the statute solely to a formation/enforcement posture. 0
The dissent deplored the Patterson Court's willingness to engage in a
formalistic hermeneutical approach "antithetical to Congress' vision of a
society in which contractual opportunities are equal."" l Justice Stevens,
writing separately, added: "An at-will employee. . . is not merely
performing an existing contract; she is constantly remaking that contract.
8 2
In response to these and other contentions, Congress amended § 1981 in
1991 to reaffirm "that the right 'to make and enforce contracts' free from
race discrimination includes ... 'the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship."' As we shall see,
those amendments did not categorically settle all issues. New issues arise
that must be sifted through. They include: contractual sufficiency, the
meaning of the word "terms," and a determination of whether discharge is
now subject to the amended statute.
While the focus of this article is Gonzalez and post-Gonzalez
decisions, it is instructive to consider the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
McKnight v. General Motors, Inc.,84 which attempts to apply the Patterson
decision. This opinion was issued after Patterson, but prior to the passage
of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, by a federal circuit that is arguably
disinclined to give statutes an expansive reading. In this case, a black
male, McKnight, alleged that General Motors fired him both because of his
race and in retaliation for his decision to file claims of racial discrimination
against the company.' The plaintiff, an at-will employee, prevailed at trial
employee. Id. at 186-87.
76. Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1050 (5th
Cir. 1998).
77. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 189 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
78. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 205-07(Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 207-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 37 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 730-
31.
84. 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 908 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1990).
85. Id. at 107.
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86but the judge declined to reinstate him. 6 While the case was before the
Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court resolved Patterson. Hence, the
appellate court concentrated on whether termination because of race and
retaliation for filing anti-discrimination complaints constituted actionable
misconduct in light of the constraints Patterson imposed on § 1981
lawsuits that implicate post-formation conduct. Despite the possibility that
dicta in McKnight "suggests that an employment at-will situation might
support § 1981 claims," 87 the Seventh Circuit held that § 1981 does not
extend to conduct by the employer after the contractual relationship has
been established.88 Thus, McKnight's discriminatory discharge failed to
infringe his right to make a contract. In so deciding, the court sides with
the Fifth 9 and Ninth9° Circuits and against the Eighth Circuit.91
Notwithstanding that determination, it is important to note that Chief Judge
Posner's opinion undeniably states that "[e]mployment at-will is not a state
of nature but a continuing contractual relation."9 2 Yet, even that conclusion
seems to implicate only certain terms and conditions of the contract such as
"'wages, benefits, duties, working conditions' and all other terms but one,
the term of the employment."93 If this constrained approach is found to be
persuasive, an argument exists which suggests that § 1981 pertains to
employment at-will with the exception of certain terms of employment.
B. Section 12 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act-the Current Status of
Employment-At-Will and § 1981
While a comprehensive examination of the legislative record
transcends the scope of this enterprise, the legislative history that
accompanied the 1991 Civil Rights Act states that one of its purposes was
to respond "to a number of recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court that sharply cut back on the scope and effectiveness of... important
federal laws [that ban discrimination in employment]. 94  While that
statement is neither richly elegant nor suffused with meaning, "the existing
text of section 1981 was redesignated as section 1981(a) and subsections
86. Id. at 117.
87. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998)
(questioning the viability of that conclusion in light of Patterson).
88. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109.
89. See Carroll v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1990);
Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 807 (5th Cir. 1990).
90. See Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849
(9th Cir. 1990).
91. See Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 638 (8th Cir. 1990).
92. McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109.
93. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998)
(citing McKnight, 908 F.2d at 109).
94. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,730-31.
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(b) and (c) were added."95
Section 12 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 adds subsection (b) to §
1981 and states: "For the purposes of this section, the term, 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship. 9 6 Perforce, "[s]ection
1981 now clearly prohibits discriminatory conduct that occurs both before
and after the establishment of the contractual relationship. 9 7 Significantly,
§ 1981 as amended "continues to center on the protection of contractual
rights."98 Whilst "an employee can now seek redress for discriminatory
conduct engaged in by her employer either before or after the formation of
the employment relationship, any claim brought pursuant to section 1981
must still be supported by an underlying right of the employee to 'make and
enforce contracts."' 99 This of course raises two questions concerning the
content of the relationship. First, is there really a contract or is the
relationship something else? Second, if the employee enters into an
agreement at-will, does such a relationship meet the contractual
sufficiencyl ° requirement of § 1981?
Significantly, in applying Patterson to conduct that occurred before
the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Tenth Circuit stated
unequivocally that § 1981 does not apply to conduct that can be
distinguished from the plaintiffs right to form a contract. 01 The court
declined to apply the 1991 Civil Rights Act retroactively to plaintiffs
discharge claim because § 1981, without the amendments, does not extend
to "breach of the terms of the contract or imposition of discriminatory
working conditions."'10 2 In contrast, this court concluded that discharge
decisions are included in the amended version of the statute. 1°3 Since one
95. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991) (explaining what
the term "make and enforce contracts" refers to).
96. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72
(1991).
97. Perry, 199 F.3d at 1132.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For example, if the employment relationship simply conforms to the default rule of
employment-at-will, is termination a contract term that is capable of being altered by the
statute? More generally, what are the implications for employment-at-will agreements
which fail to possess a term or condition which the plaintiff seeks to alter by enforcing §
1981? See infra pp. 240-241.
101. Hopkins v. Seagate, 30 F.3d 104, 106 (10th Cir. 1994).
102. Id. at 106 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989)).
While the facts suggest that the plaintiff held an indefinite form of employment,
employment-at-will was not explicitly litigated in this case.
103. Id. at 105.
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purpose of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was to respond to Patterson, it may
be useful to examine the state and application of the law prior to the
issuance of the Patterson decision.
C. Federal Appellate Decisions Before Patterson
The following chart recaps relevant federal appellate case law as
applied to employer conduct occurring before Patterson and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act.
FEDERAL APPELLATE CASES IMPLICATING THE INTERSECTION OF
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL AND SECTION 1981 14




Davis v. Statute of Discharged Racial Complaint
United Limitations for "won Harassment was timely
States Steel Period re: § safety" after with respect
Supply, 581 1981 complaining to § 1981
F2d 335 (3d about racial action
Cir. 1978) slurs
Guillory v. Did the Discharged For the
St. Landry district court and was not employer on
Parish (1) apply an rehired the merits of
Police Jury, improper the § 1981
802 F.2d legal claim
822 (5th Cir. standard to
1986) the § 1981
claim and
104 This table is largely based on a LEXIS search conducted on March 24, 2000 in
the Federal Courts File. The search terms included "employment-at-will" and
"section 1981". Other appellate cases found in the search process include: Yatvin
v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 840 F.2d 412,414 (7th Cir. 1988) (dealing primarily
with claims brought under Title VII and § 1983); Siu v. Johnson, 748 F.2d 238,
239 (4th Cir. 1984) (dealing with a tenure dispute); Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684
F.2d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 1982) (involving a Title VII claim); Cal. Brewers Ass'n
v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 601 (1980) (litigating a § 1981 claim, but the case was
litigated primarily under Title VII); Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 577 (7th Cir.
1980) (involving § 1983 and § 1988 claim); Pearson v. Furneo Constr. Co., 563
F.2d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 1977) (focusing on a Title VII claim); King v. Greenblatt,
560 F.2d 1024, 1025 (1st Cir. 1977) (dealing with the issue of reasonable attorney
fees).
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Archie v. Did his first Discharged Error in On remand,
Chi. Truck amended allegedly for loading Archie could
Drivers, 585 compliant an error in freight seek leave to
F.2d 210 state a loading amend and
(7th Cir. § 1981 freight include his
1978) claim? § 1981 claim
Coates v. Was there a Individual Alleged that For the
Johnson & pattern and plaintiff blacks were defendant on
Johnson, practice of discharged treated less the class and
756 F.2d discrimina- for sleeping favorably individual
524 (7th Cir. tion with on the job than whites discriminatio
1985) respect to with respect n claim
Coates and a to discipline; (little
class of Alleged that analysis of
workers the employer § 1981
which gives engaged in a claim, but
rise to a plan to § 1981 claim
Title VII and reduce black seems
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Poolaw v. Must the Discharged Alleged Plaintiff
City of claimant and was not discriminat- stated a
Anadarko, claim a reinstated ory (1) job § 1981
660 F.2d property classification claim and
459 (10th interest in (2) promoti- there was no
Cir. 1981) employment onal need to state
in order to practices and a property
bring a § (3) rates of interest in
1981 claim? pay job
McMillian v. Has the Discharged Defendant
Svetanoff, claimant by new provided
878 F.2d proved her judge who legitimate
186 (7th Cir. § 1981 terminated non-
1989) claim, all at-will discrimina-








Walker v. Question of Discharged Since
Consumers whether the plaintiff did
Power Co., employer not appeal §
824 F.2d violated § 1981 claim,
499 (6th Cir. 1981 by the
1987) discharging judgment of
the plaintiff trial court in
was tried at favor of






































Waters v. Were the Discriminat- Facts
Sic. Steel backpay and ion in hiring, sufficient to
Workers of attorney fees seniority, ground
Int'l awarded for layoffs, and § 1981
Harverster violation of recall rights liability
Co., 502 Title VII and
F.2d 1309 § 1981
(7th Cir. appropriate?
1974)
Krulik v. Bd. Was the Plaintiff Not Because the
of Educ. of judgment alleged a promoted, appellate
N.Y., 831 n.o.v. issued cause of failure to court found
F.2d 1184 against action for transfer that there
(2d Cir. plaintiff s constructive plaintiff was no
1986) § 1981 claim discharge along with evidence of
correct? staff, post- intentional
Was any heart attack discrimina-
evidence of working tion, it did
intentional conditions at not reach the
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Lopez v. S.B. Employment Construction Separate Plaintiff can
Thomas, -at-will issue discharge hostile work establish a
Inc., 831 was not claim arose environment § 1981 claim
F.2d 1184 raised but out of claim for
(2d Cir. discrimina- asserted constructive
1987) tory hostile discharge
discharge environment
was alleged
Adams v. Can an Did not Alleged Plaintiff can
McDougal, indefinite allege discriminati- establish a
695 F.2d term discharge on in the § 1981 claim
104 (5th Cir. employee/ terms and regarding
1983) appointee conditions of terms and
state a claim his conditions
regarding employment for indefinite
terms and and in his term
conditions employer's employment.
under § failure to
1981? rehire.
This summary indicates that both contracts at-will and post-formation
conduct apparently furnished a basis for § 1981 relief for workers prior to
Patterson. Discharge, racial harassment, rates of pay and other forms of
allegedly dissimilar treatment, independent of contract formation and
enforcement, have also supplied a basis for § 1981 claims for at-will
employees. While these issues were not always directly decided by the
courts, it is difficult to refute the conclusion that post-contract formation
claims were sufficient to sustain a § 1981 claim prior to the date of the
Patterson decision. After the Patterson opinion, and before the enactment
of the statutory amendment to § 1981, a number of federal appellate cases
applied Patterson retroactively to sustain the dismissal of lawsuits which
sought to apply § 1981 to post-formation conduct including harassment or
discharge.105 If the goal of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was to restore the law
105. See, e.g., Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1386-87 (10th Cir.
1991) (stating that discriminatory discharge is not actionable under § 1981 given the
Patterson decision); Dabor v. Dayton Power & Light Co., No. 90-3307, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2402, at *7 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1991) (per curiam) (finding that discharge remains
outside of § 1981's protective umbrella); Courtney v. Canyon Television & Appliance
Rental, Inc., 899 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that "refusal to hire an employee on
226
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to its previous state, and if the congressional purpose was actually enacted
into law, then one can conclude that the statute encompasses at-will
relationships and post-formation issues, including terms and conditions.1
0 6
Still, the possibility exists that the federal courts may constrain that
conclusion through certain interpretations of employment-at-will.
D. The Intersection of Employment-At-Will and the Amended Version of
§ 1981
As the next section demonstrates, the statutory amendments to § 1981
effectively preclude Patterson from being used as a dispositive employer
defense to terms and conditions, and other post-formation claims with
respect to all employment situations. Still, the statute must confront the
question of whether or not employment-at-will and its default provisions
fall within the amplified parameters of § 1981. Gonzalez asserted that
when an at-will plaintiff claims that an employer interfered with the right to
enter into an employment contract by not recalling her from a layoff, "there
was no employment contract to interfere with" within the meaning of
§ 1981.L07 On the other hand, one judge, arguing for a broader
interpretation of the statute, stated that § 1981 includes "the right to
continue to work, in the face of racially discriminatory termination." 08 The
next section attempts to clarify these disparate views.
the basis of race is actionable under section 1981, whereas subsequent harassment or
maltreatment of an employee on account of race is not."); Carroll v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co.
of Am., 891 F.2d 1174, 1177 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that retroactive application of
Patterson precludes relief based on post-formation conduct including constructive discharge
under § 1981); Lavender v. V & B Transmissions & Auto. Repair, 897 F.2d 805, 807-08
(5th Cir. 1990) (holding consistent with Patterson that since termination neither involves the
formation of contracts, nor an opportunity to enter into a new contract, the plaintiffs
discriminatory discharge claim is not allowed); Wilmer v. Tenn. Eastman Co., 919 F.2d
1160, 1163 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that an employee at-will failed to state a § 1981 claim
for discriminatory discharge after Patterson); id. at 1164-68 (Jones, J., dissenting) (stating
that Patterson does not apply to a § 1981 claim for discriminatory discharge). But see Hicks
v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that racially
discriminatory discharge is actionable under § 1981 because discriminatory discharge was
not at issue in Patterson).
106. It remains possible that the legislative purpose is incomplete or imprecise since the
legislators have not considered all possible situations and therefore, "legislative intent, even
if clearly known, will not answer all possible problems in applying rules." Bix, supra note
57, at 41 (discussing H.L.A. Hart's theories relating to legal positivism). A full discussion
of the pertinent legislative history exceeds the scope of this article.
107. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F.3d 1025, 1034 (7th Cir. 1998).
108. McKnight v. Gen. Motors, Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (Fairchild, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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mII. FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN THE
MIRROR OF THE OTHER CIRCUITS
The primary questions which confront federal appellate courts are: (1)
whether employment-at-will is a contract or a contractual relationship and
(2) whether employment-at-will retains satisfactory contract sufficiency so
that plaintiffs can challenge otherwise valid terminations, or other post-
contract formation conduct, within the meaning of § 1981. These two
questions are different but related. Unhelpfully, they may at times be
conflated. In any case, one might ask, for example, whether they can
challenge their termination given that at-will employees do not have
contractual rights to a specific duration of employment? In order to answer
that question, it may be necessary to determine whether: (1) there is a
contract within the meaning of § 1981 available to protect the worker and
(2) there is a duration term of the agreement which is capable of being
altered by the statute?
A. Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co. (7th Cir. 1998)
In Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., Juana Gonzalez, a
Hispanic worker, claimed that: (1) she had an employment contract with
her employer and (2) she was discriminated against with regard to a term or
condition of that contract in violation of § 1981 by virtue of the fact that
she was laid off while other similarly situated white employees were not. 109
She appealed from a district court opinion which granted the employer's
motion for summary judgment. Since she "never challenged Ingersoll's...
layoff and/or termination policies as discriminatory in and of themselves
below... [she was] barred from raising them for the first time [at the
appellate level]." 1n Consequently, this case failed to squarely address the
viability of a § 1981 claim premised on at-will employment.
While agreeing that the district had improperly limited the scope of
§ 1981 by holding it inapplicable to any post-formation conduct, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment based on the dicta
that no contractual relationship existed and that even if there was one,
Gonzalez neglected to comply with her burden under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green."' In order to reach that conclusion, one must first
ascertain whether, under Illinois law, Gonzalez had an employment
contract. The initial answer seemed to be no, but limits on that conclusion
109. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1033. This case also included claims brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1991), and for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1991).
110. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1033.
111. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
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remain.' Subsequently, the court stated that employment-at-will could be
a contract, but § 1981 enforcement may require greater contract sufficiency
than Gonzalez demonstrated." 3 The court insinuates that even if a contract
exists, there must be a term which is capable of being modified.'
4
Illinois, like most American jurisdictions, accepts that "an employer-
employee relationship without an explicit durational term is presumed to be
an at-will relationship."" 5 Unless the facts give rise to a clearly mandated
public policy exception,1 6 Illinois employers are allowed to discharge at-
will employees "for any reason or for no reasons.""17  The court
summarized it's position as follows:
By its terms, section 1981 governs contractual relationships.
Gonzalez's section 1981 claim lacks merit because there is no
evidence to show that she had ever been employed under a
contract with Ingersoll or that she was after her return in October,
1994. Section 1981 bars all racial discrimination with respect to
making and enforcing contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). In order
to bring a section 1981 claim there must at least be a contract." 8
Since Ms. Gonzalez "did not have any contractual rights regarding the
term of her employment, she cannot claim that she was discriminated
against with respect to [her] layoff."1 9 Thus the Seventh Circuit, while not
squarely deciding the issue, 20 and conceding that employment-at-will at
least conceptually implicates § 1981, engaged in speculation which
112. The court stated that there was no contract to interfere with and that Gonzalez failed
to establish a contractual relationship. Id. at 1034. Additionally, the Spriggs opinion cites
Gonzalez for the proposition that at-will employees have no contractual rights to specific
terms of employment. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1019 (4th Cir.
1999).
113. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034.
114. The Tenth Circuit in Perry v. Woodward concentrates on this aspect of the Gonzalez
reasoning. See Perry v. Woodard, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999).
115. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1034 (citing Evans v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 556 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994)).
116. Id. (citing Talley v. Wash. Inventory Serv., 37 F.3d 310,311 (7th Cir. 1994)).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1035. In reaching this conclusion, the court cites several district court
opinions that find no underlying contractual relationship, see Moorer v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 964 F. Supp. 665, 676 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that an at-will employee's
§ 1981 claim for layoff, due to company reduction in force, should be dismissed);
Moscovitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that an at-will
employee's § 1981 claim, arising out of his termination from positions with both police
department and board of education, should be dismissed); Askew v. May Merch. Corp., No.
87-CIV-7835, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1919, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991) (holding that
the absence of a contractual relationship is fatal to an at-will employee's § 1981 claim).
120. The court stated that it need not determine whether the plaintiffs at-will status
provided adequate support for her § 1981 claim because the claim would fail for other
reasons. Gonzalez, 133 F.3d at 1035.
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implicitly found that employment-at-will provides spongy, yet insufficient
footing on which to base a § 1981 claim because her employment lacks
adequate contractual sufficiency. This contention is apparently based on
the view that since the parties failed to agree explicitly on the length of the
contract, the default rule (the at-will presumption) is not a term of the
contract. If it is not a term of the contract, then it cannot be altered by
§ 1981. On the other hand, as Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
indicates, "[m]uch contract law consists of rules which may be varied by
agreement of the parties. Such rules are sometimes stated in terms of
presumed intention, and they may be thought of as implied terms of an
agreement."'2' Since Illinois presumes and arguably supplies a durational
length, then one can argue that there is in fact a term which is capable of
being altered by § 1981. This possibility was effectively adopted in
subsequent federal appellate cases.
B. Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Association of Lubbock (5th Cir. 1998)
The Fadeyi court reached its decision approximately ten months
after Gonzalez. In Fadeyi, a black female employed by Planned
Parenthood for seven years, alleged that her employer engaged in various
acts of racial discrimination during the course of her employment. 2 2 Since
neither the EEOC nor the Texas Commission on Human Rights had
jurisdiction, her complaints were dismissed. 23 Planned Parenthood fired
124her two days after receiving notification of this decision. In its defense
to Fadeyi's § 1981 claim, Planned Parenthood asserted that her claim must
fail because she could not show the existence of a contract, which is an
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, section 5 cmt. b (1981). If the term is
implied-in-law, it is sometimes referred to as a gap-filler. Such terms "are said to be
imposed by the legal system for reasons of principle or policy rather than consented to by
the parties." Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
78 VA. L. REv. 821, 822-23 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules
and Contractual Consent]. Barnett avers:
That such implied-in-law terms are based on the parties' consent has long been
thought to be pure fiction. If the publicly provided rules of contract law almost
always operate where there is a gap in the manifestation of assent, then
consequently a gap-filling provision must be coercively imposed on parties who
have not, by assumption, consented to its imposition.
Id. at 823.
122. Among other things Fadeyi alleged that her employer engaged in discriminatory
scheduling and distribution of office resources, giving her and another black employee an
application for membership to the Ku Klux Klan. Ultimately, she was terminated from
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essential element in a § 1981 action. '2 The district court accordingly
granted summary judgment to Fadeyi's employer on the ground, that as an
at-will employee she did not have a "contract" on which to base a claim
under § 198 1.126 The sole issue on appeal was whether "a Texas
employment-at-will relationship is a contract for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1994). ' 27
Despite the widespread acceptance of the validity of employment-at-
will in the United States, "[c]ase law addressing whether an at-will
employee may bring an action under § 1981 is surprisingly sparse."'
2 8
Until this decision no circuit court had squarely resolved this issue in the
wake of Patterson.129 In reviewing Patterson and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, the Fifth Circuit ultimately accepted the conclusion that a number of
courts have found persuasive: "[t]o hold that at-will employees have no
right of action under § 1981 would effectively eviscerate the very
protection that Congress expressly intended to install for minority
employees, especially those who, by virtue of working for small
businesses, are not protected by Title VII.' 3 Moreover, "Texas law firmly
supports the contractual nature of an at-will employment relationship as
well.' 31 Citing the Texas Supreme Court with approval, the Fifth Circuit
accepted that a "promise may be a valid and subsisting contract even
though it is voidable .... A similar situation exists with regard to contracts
terminable at will.'132 Perforce, "an employment-at-will relationship is a
contractual, one even though either party can terminate it without cause at
any time. ' 33 While this relationship is contractual that conclusion only
answers part of the question. Beyond the contractual nature of the
agreement, the question remained whether the contract was imbued with
satisfactory contractual sufficiency to sustain a § 1981 action.
Additionally, the court referred to both the Texas Supreme Court and
the Texas Legislature's emphasis on the importance of public policy when




128. Id. at 1049.
129. Id. at 1048.
130. Id. at 1050. Numerous courts have accepted this view. See, e.g., Mogdhadarn v.
Morris, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1262 (N.D. Fla. 2000); Pettis v. Alexander Graphics, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 950, 953 (1999); Watson v. Lucent, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Kan. 1999). On the
other hand, a significant number of courts within the Second Circuit have disagreed. See,
e.g., Mungin v. Macklowe, No. 97 CIV. 6058, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24,2000).
131. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1050.
132. Id. at 1050-51.
133. Id. at 1051.
134. Id.
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the Texas Supreme Court invalidated the termination of employees for
refusing to perform illegal acts ordered by their employers, and that the
Texas Legislature enacted exceptions to the at-will doctrine in order to
protect such employees from discharge on the basis of race, sex, color,
disability, religion and national origin, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
while an at-will employee can be fired for good, bad, or no cause at all,
they cannot be fired for an illicit cause.1 35  Discriminating against an
employee on the basis of race is illegal and against public policy because
Congress, in amending § 1981, advanced such public policy concerns by
creating a vehicle for "every employee to remedy racial discrimination in
the workplace. Congress could not have meant to exclude at-will workers
from the reach of § 1981, as to do so would be to allow use of the
ubiquitous at-will doctrine 'as leverage to incite violations of our state and
federal laws."'' 136 This conclusion departs, at least marginally, from the
conclusion of one observer that employment-at-will is an employment
relationship with no "legally enforceable safeguards against termination.'
3 7
The Fifth Circuit's conclusions warrant analysis. Discharging an at-
will employee for racial reasons contravenes § 1981 only if it is illegal to
terminate an at-will employee for such reasons. By its terms, the 1991
Civil Rights Act only precludes discrimination with respect to the making
and enforcement of contracts. This includes the "making, performance,
modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship."'131 While § 1981 applies to discriminatory conduct that
occurs both before and after the establishment of a contractual relationship,
it does not explicitly add to the contract itself. Therefore, the pertinent
question is whether § 1981 extends to something that, according to the
Gonzalez court, may not be within the contract, namely the discharge of the
employee. While Illinois law supplies a presumptive term of the contract,
the pertinent issue becomes, how does Texas decide this question? Rather
than directly confronting this doctrinal issue raised by Gonzalez, the Fadeyi
court merely concluded that since employment-at-will is a contract, it is
modifiable by § 1981, because a public policy exception exists in Texas,
135. Id. at 1051-52.
136. Id. at 1052. This conclusion is potentially problematic. For instance, surely it is the
public policy of the United States to discourage discrimination on the basis of age.
However, in the skillful hands of a lawyer it might be possible for an employee-at-will
plaintiff, who is discharged at age thirty-eight and replaced by someone who is twenty-four
years old, to argue that the language of the Fifth Circuit creates a public policy exception to
at-will employment despite the fact that her age is less than the statutory age of protection. It
is doubtful that this court wished to create an exception which devours the rule.
137. POSNER, supra note 21, at 693.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
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regarding the discharge of employees at-will.
139
C. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass (4th Cir. 1999)
The Spriggs case was decided more than a year after the decision in
Gonzalez was handed down. This case directly confronts two related
doctrinal issues. First, is employment-at-will a contractual relationship?
140
Second, does at-will employment retain adequate contract sufficiency so
that plaintiffs can challenge their otherwise contractually-permissible
terminations under § 1981?141 James Spriggs brought suit alleging racial
harassment and retaliation in connection with his at-will employment
relationship with Diamond Auto Glass.142 Spriggs alleged that severe racial
harassment amounted to his forced employment termination. 141 The district
court determined that because at-will contracts "confer no rights that are
enforceable in an action ex contractu . .. [they] cannot serve as the
predicate for a Section 1981 action."'144
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court based on the notion that
an at-will employment relationship can support a § 1981 action where the
employer engaged in racial harassment that was sufficiently severe to
compel the victim to end the employment relationship. 145 The court found
the Congressional amendments to § 1981 persuasive:
The 1991 Act amended § 1981 by adding, inter alia, a new,
broad definition of "make and enforce contracts": For purposes of
this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the
making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts,
and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and• -. -46
conditions of the contractual relationship.
A § 1981 action must be therefore grounded "on purposeful, racially
discriminatory actions that affect at least one of the contractual aspects
listed in § 1981(b).' 47 Because at-will employment "is contractual,....
such relationships may therefore serve as predicate contracts for § 1981
claims.' 48 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit found itself in
disagreement not only with the lower court but a number of other district
139. Fadeyi, 160 F.3d at 1050-52.
140. Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018 (4th Cir. 1999).
141. Id. at 1019-20.
142. Id. at 1016.
143. Spriggs alleged that his supervisor, Stickell, repeatedly used racial slurs in the
plaintiffs presence and at times they were directed toward him. Id. at 1017.
144. Id. at 1017.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1017-1018; see also, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
147. Id. at 1018.
148. Id. at 1018-19.
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courts as well. 49 Helpfully, the court divided the contrasting cases into two
distinct groups. The court stated that "[c]ases in the first group simply
assume without extensive analysis that at-will employment relationships
are not 'contracts' within the meaning of § 1981. ""0 In the second group,
the cases "acknowledge that the at-will employment relationship is a type
of a contract, but conclude that because at-will employees have no
contractual fights to specific terms of employment, they cannot challenge
their contractually-permissible terminations under § 1981."1'  In other
words, within the second group, the cases "presume that in addition to
proving purposeful racial discrimination, a § 1981 plaintiff must prove that
the discriminatory act violated a specific contract right."15 2 This court
disagreed with both groups of cases and their attendant doctrinal
conclusions. Citing Fadeyi with approval, it stated that "[p]roving breach
of the underlying contract is neither necessary to a successful § 1981 claim,
nor, standing alone, sufficient to make out such a claim. An employer may
breach a contract for non-discriminatory reasons; this, of course, would not
give rise to a § 1981 claim.0 5 3 On the other hand, "an employer may act in
perfect accord with its contractual rights-for example, when it terminates an
at-will employee-but it may still violate § 1981 if that action is racially
discriminatory and affects one of the contractual aspects listed in
§ 1981(b)., 15 4  Since § 1981(b) specifically includes "termination of
contracts" as an aspect of making and enforcing contracts protected in
§ 1981(a), and since the plaintiff alleged that purposeful, racially
discriminatory actions by his employer were so severe that they caused a
"discriminatory and retaliatory forced termination of employment," Spriggs
stated a claim within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.155 Thus, at-will
employment is a contract and the default provision is capable of being
altered by § 1981.
D. Perry v. Woodward (10th Cir. 1999)
In the most recent case, decided almost two years after Gonzalez, the
Tenth Circuit directly addressed, for the first time, the question of whether
149. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Pepsico Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d 548 (M.D.N.C. 1998); Moorer v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 964 F. Supp. 665 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Moscowitz v. Brown, 850
F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Askew v. May Merch. Corp., No. 87 Civ. 7835, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1919, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991).
150. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019. See, e.g., Moscowitz, 850 F. Supp. at 1192.
151. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133
F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998).
152. Spriggs, 165 F.3d at 1019-20 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 1020.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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an at-will employee could bring a § 1981 lawsuit. '56 The court of appeals
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Elizabeth
Perry's § 1981 claim 157 because the district court misapplied the substantive
law when it concluded that an at-will employee cannot maintain a cause of
action under § 1981.'s5 Pursuant to New Mexico's default rules, 1 9 "she was
an at-will employee."'16° Perry, a Hispanic women, alleged that she had
been discriminated against on the basis of her race and retaliated against
because she opposed unlawful employment practices under state and
federal law. Perry was hired as Deputy County Clerk, and at the time of
her hiring she understood the position to be at-will.16' Her supervisor, Judy
Woodward, "[b]egan making racist remarks to employees shortly after
taking office as County Clerk."162 Among other things, Ms. Woodward
referred to Hispanics as "dirty Mexicans," indicated that "Mexicans smell
bad," and stated that she did not like Hispanics because her ex-husband left
her for a "hot blooded Mexican." 163 Moreover, she forbade Perry, who held
hiring authority, to hire "any more Hispanics." '64
The district court dismissed Perry's action for two reasons: (1) she
failed to provide proof of intentional discrimination and (2) she was an at-
will employee and was therefore, unable to establish a violation of
§ 1981.165 The latter is most germane for our purposes. The defendants
contended that § 1981 requires "the existence of a contractual relationship
between an employee and her employer and.., that this contractual
relationship can only arise if an employee and her employer have entered
into a written employment contract.1 66  Therefore, the defendants
"argue[d] that the absence of a written employment contract [was] fatal to
[Perry's] section 1981 claim." 67 Consequently, "Perry [could not] maintain
a cause of action under section 1981.16
8
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. It held that "Perry's relationship with
her employer consisted of Perry's rendition of services in exchange for her
156. See Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999).
157. The court also reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Elizabeth
Perry's state racial discrimination claim. Id. at 1142.
158. Id. at 1134.
159. Consistent with New Mexico law, employment is terminable "at will," unless there
is an explicit contract of employment stating otherwise. Id. at 1132.
160. Id. at 1130.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1130-31.
164. Id. at 1131.
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employer's payment of wages.0 69 Perforce, "[u]nder New Mexico law, this
is a contractual relationship." 170  Despite the fact that Perry could be
terminated for a good or bad reason, this court declined to conclude that
termination predicated on racial considerations is beyond judicial review.17 '
Having reached that conclusion, the issue remained whether "the
contractual relationship between Perry and her employer embodied
sufficient contractual rights to support a cause of action for wrongful
termination under section 1981.,,172 The resolution of this question turned
on the meaning of the word "terms." As previously considered in Spriggs,
it can be argued that since "an at-will employment contract does not
encompass termination terms, an at-will employee cannot bring an action
for wrongful termination against her employer under section 1981."'
17
Despite the fact that the statute governs the "making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms and conditions of the contractual relationship,"1 74
the defendant effectively argued that "because an at-will employee may be
discharged at any time, the terms of an at-will employment contract extend
only to wages, benefits, duties, and working conditions, but do not
encompass the time or manner of termination.1 75  If this view is
persuasive, "terminations for any reason or no reason are permissible under
the terms of an at-will employment contract [and] employees cannot bring
claims under section 1981 alleging wrongful termination."176  On the
contrary, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the "amendment of section 1981
to include a prohibition against racially discriminatory conduct in the
termination of contracts has effectively altered the at-will employment
relationship. 1 77 While an employer may "discharge an at-will employee
for any reason or no reason.., an employer can no longer terminate an at-
will employment relationship for a racially discriminatory reason.'
78
Citing a number of cases, the court had no difficulty with the conclusion
that "the employment-at-will relationship encompasses sufficient
contractual rights to support section 1981 claims for wrongful
169. Id. at 1133.
170. Id.
171. Among other things, the court cited Hopkins v. Seagate, 30 F.3d 104, 105 (10th Cir.
1994) for the proposition that the termination of contracts is included in the protections
afforded by § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Perry, 199 F.3d at 1132.
172. Id. at 1133.
173. Id.
174. Pub. L. No. 102-166(II), § 101(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991); see also Perry,
199 F.3d at 1132.
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termination." 179 Hence, the Tenth Circuit failed to find the contrary dicta in
Gonzalez convincing.
E. The Second Circuit
Importantly, the Second Circuit is currently considering whether an at-
will employee may bring suit under § 1981."0 Significantly, several
district courts within the Second Circuit have decided that "while an at-will
employee may not have a per se contract with his employer, he may have a
contractual relationship with the employer for purposes of Section 1981."18l
These courts largely rely on the opinion in Fadeyi 82 However, a "vast
majority of judges" '183 in the Southern District of New York, and others
both inside and outside of this circuit, have declined to adopt the Fadeyi
position'84 because they "hold that a contract is a prerequisite for a Section
1981 suit." '185 These judges have held that: (1) under New York law,
"absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment
relationship is presumed to be hiring at will, terminable at any time '18 6 and
(2) absent a clear Congressional mandate, § 1981 does not alter the
termination "term" of the plaintiffs employment.1 7 Mungin illustrates that
state law jurisdictions which refuse to classify at-will employment as a
contractual relationship constitute a barrier to anti-discrimination law under
§ 198 1.18 Importantly, both the Spriggs case and a number of New York
cases, including Mungin, cite the Moscowitz case as a decision that
concludes that at-will employment is not a contract.189  Moscowitz,
179. Id. See, e.g., LaRocca v. Precision Motorcars, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 762, 774-77 (D.
Neb. 1999); O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 35 F. Supp. 2d 832, 837-38 (D.N.M. 1999);
Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201-02 (S.D. Ohio 1998).
180. See Lauture v. IBM, No. 98 Civ. 4882, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20637, at *1-*2
(S.D.N.Y. May 25, 1999).
181. Mungin v. Macklowe, No. 97 Civ. 6058, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *3-4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,2000) (emphasis added).
182. See id. at *4. (citing Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d
1048 (5th Cir. 1998)).
183. See Lauture, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20637, at *2.
184. See Mungin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3811, at *5.
185. Id.
186. Id. at *6 (quoting Depetris v. Union Settlement Ass'n, Inc., 657 N.E.2d 269, 271
(1995)).
187. See id.
188. A number of New York cases accept this possibility. See, e.g., Sutherland v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Law, No. 96 Civ. 6935, 1999 WL 314186, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1999);
Bascomb v. Smith Barney Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8747, 1999 WL 20853, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15,
1999); Moorer v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 964 F. Supp. 665, 675-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1997);
Moscowitz v. Brown, 850 F. Supp. 1185, 1192 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
189. Moscowitz has apparently been followed by Mungin. See Mungin, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3811, at *6. In addition, Moscowitz has been cited by a number of courts for the
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therefore, warrants analysis.
1. Moscowitz v. Brown (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
This lawsuit arose, at least partially, out of facts that occurred after
Patterson but before the effective date of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.'90 The
plaintiff, an Orthodox Jew, brought a § 1981 claim presumably based on
his dismissal from two entities: the New York Police Department (NYPD)
and the Board of Education.'9 ' His alleged termination from the NYPD
occurred on January 14, 1991, well before the effective date of the 1991
Civil Rights Act. That statute took effect on November 21, 1991, and
according to the United States Supreme Court does not apply
retroactively. 92 However, under "the amended Civil Rights Act, 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the termination of contracts, and therefore a
claim of discriminatory discharge could arise under Section 1981 ... based
on his termination by the Board of Education, which occurred after
November 1991."'' On the other hand, this court found that "according to
the plain language of Section 1981, plaintiffs claim would have to be based
on a contractual relationship with the Board of Education .... ", " Since his
employment is governed by N.Y. Civ. Ser. Law § 65, which defines him as
an employee at-will, a contractual relationship could not be found.' 95 But
that conclusion may simply amount to dicta as the court went on to state
that the plaintiff "fails to specifically allege that his termination by the
Board of Education was discriminatory"'' 96 as required by § 1981.
Arguably, his claim merits dismissal on grounds that it fails to state a cause
of action, even if § 1981 could plausibly apply to a discharge of an
employee at-will after the effective date of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. If
this criticism is persuasive, it becomes dubious that Moscowitz reliably
states the law. On the other hand, another avenue of attack also exists in a
leading New York case regarding employment-at-will. That is the topic of
proposition that at-will employment fails to support a § 1981 claim. See, e.g., Bishop v.
Avera, 177 F.3d 1233, 1235 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999); Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co.,
133 F.3d 1025, 1035 (7th Cir. 1998). But see Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d
1015, 1019 (4th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Die Fliedermaus L.L.C., 77 F. Supp. 2d 460, 469 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). According to a search of the LEXIS on-line database conducted on April
27, 2000, Moscowitz appeared in 63 citing decisions.
190. The Moscowitz court relies on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Rivers
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 300 (1994). That case held that the 1991 Civil
Rights Act does not apply retroactively. See Moscowitz, 850 F. Supp. at 1192.
191. Id. at 1189.
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the next subsection.
2. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug (N.Y. 1982)
One of New York's leading cases on employment-at-will suggests that
in the absence of an express agreement limiting its duration, an
employment relationship is generally presumed to be terminable at-will.
197
The Court avered that the etymology of the employment-at-will doctrine in
New York arose out of a perceived need "to afford employees the freedom
to contract to suit their needs and to allow employers to exercise their best
judgement with regard to employment matters."19' While this gives the
employer unfettered power to dismiss employees without cause,' 9 it is far
from clear that it means a contract does not exist. In fact, as the concurring
opinion ably points out, "in every contract there is an implied undertaking
on the part of each party that he will not intentionally and purposely do
anything to prevent the other party from carrying out the agreement on his
part. ,200 If this perspective is legitimate, a contract, albeit a limited one,
exists. Thus, the Moscowitz conclusion that a contractual relationship does
not exist becomes doubtful. Assuming the incoherence of the conclusion
that New York employment-at-will fails to give rise to a contractual
relationship, a question still remains as to the content and the contractual
sufficiency of the employment agreement for purposes of § 1981. While
the judgment that employment-at-will constitutes a contract may or may
not be vindicated by the Second Circuit in pending litigation, it is possible
to reach some tentative conclusions about the overall status of the debate
concerning the collision of § 1981 and employment-at-will.
F. Analysis
It may be plausible to maintain that § 1981 should not apply to at-will
employment where the pertinent state jurisdiction declines to accept that
employment-at-will is a contract or where a contractual relationship is
absent. However, if the jurisdiction accepts that employment-at-will is a
contract, it is difficult to conclude that the employment relationship
197. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 506 N.E.2d 919, 920 (N.Y. 1987). According to a
Shepard's search conducted on April 27, 2000, Sabetay has apparently been cited in 316
citing decisions. See, e.g., Hanchard v. Facilities Dev. Corp., 651 N.E.2d 872, 874 (N.Y.
1995).
198. Sabetay, 506 N.E.2d at 920; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441
(N.Y. 1982) (observing that the employment-at-will rule originated in English law regarding
master and servant relationships, but received its greatest boost from the laissez-faire
attitudes of the nineteenth century).
199. Sabetay, 506 N.E.2d at 920.
200. Id. at 924.
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remains unmodifiable by § 1981. If the federal circuit's prevailing
understanding of the law prior to Patterson was accurate, if the 1991 Civil
Rights Act successfully restored the law to its prior position, and if the
federal circuit courts that have confronted this issue since Gonzalez are
correct, then: (1) employment-at-will is arguably a contract within the
meaning of § 1981; (2) contract sufficiency exists; and (3) post-contract
formation conduct is alterable by the statute. Moreover, most recent
federal district court opinions disagree with the implications of Gonzalez.20 '
That is equally true for recent federal district opinions in the Seventh
Circuit that have interpreted Illinois law.2°2 While a substantial number of
district court decisions in the Second Circuit may disagree, employment-at-
will is arguably an adequate predicate to a § 1981 action. This conclusion
finds widespread support from conventional sources which restate the
holding in Fadeyi and conclude that "[t]o hold that at-will employees have
no right of action under § 1981 would effectively eviscerate the very
protection that Congress expressly intended to install for minority
employees... who.., are not protected by Title VII. '2 °3
A direct confrontation to this emerging consensus, derived from
freedom of contract advocates, is the contention that the duration of an at-
will employment relationship may not be a contract term that is compatible
with the notion of contracts predicated on consent. Therefore, such an
arrangement lacks adequate contractual sufficiency. An indirect
confrontation is the notion that the at-will relationship may not be a
contract because it is a form of status, in service to an oppressive ideology,
or because workers are insufficiently aware of the default rule and it would
be unfair to enforce the termination term. The next section analyzes these
201. See, e.g., Price v. Wis. Serv., 55 F. Supp. 2d 952, 955 (E.D. Wis. 1999); Farrior v.
H.J. Russell & Co., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1364 (N.D. Ga. 1999); Lane v. Ogden Entm't, Inc.,
13 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1272 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Williams v. United Dairy Farmers, 20 F.
Supp. 2d 1193, 1202 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Baker v. Am. Juice, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 878, 883
(N.D. Ind. 1994); Harris v. N.Y. Times, No. 90-C5235, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1534, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1993).
202. See, e.g., Allen v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 99-C7614, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 937, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2000); Riad v. 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc. Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 2d 748,
754-55 (N.D. Ill. 1999); Robinson v. SABIS Educ. Sys., No. 98-C4251, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9065, at *32 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 1999); Jones v. SABIS Educ. Sys., 52 F. Supp. 2d
868, 875-76 (N.D. IM. 1999). But see Saez v. Chi. Hous. Auth., No. 98-C7970, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 4109, at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 14, 1999) (mem.) (dismissing a § 1981 claim which
failed to allege a violation of contractual rights); Payne v. Abbott Lab., No. 97-C3882, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2443, at *7 (N.D. ill. Mar. 2, 1999) (mem.) (citing as persuasive authority
Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Machine Co., 133 F. 3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998)).
203. Fadeyi v. Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Lubbock, Inc., 160 F.3d 1048, 1050 (5th
Cir. 1998). Numerous courts rely on Fadeyi. See, e.g., Price, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 955-56;
Knight v. Palm City Millworks, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 1999); Lazoro v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Watson v. Lucent Tech.,
No. 98-2494-GTV, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14118, at *5 (Kan. Aug. 20, 1999).
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claims. It is possible that whether direct or indirect, these diverse claims
generated by commentators may ultimately converge with the judgment of
courts, which remain skeptical about the intersection of § 1981 and
employment-at-will.
IV. CONSENT, STATUS AND CONTRACT SUFFICIENCY--LESSONS FROM
THE COMMENTATORS
A. Analysis
It has been argued that "[b]ecause employment at will often is referred
to by one of its many aliases, such as management prerogatives, it has not
always been recognized. ',204 And yet, it is asserted that whatever it is
called, it "trumps employment discrimination law., 205 Consistent with this
perspective, the notion of worker assent, express or implied, becomes
doubtful as "inequality of bargaining power leads to the creation of forms
of oppressive subordination under the disguise of freely chosen
agreements." 206 Admittedly, the at-will doctrine appears to be:
beset on every side with both its lineage and pedigree being
challenged and 'exceptions' to the doctrine being recognized in all
jurisdictions with increasing frequency. Among the recognized
exceptions are wrongful discharge in violation of public policy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, detrimental
reliance or promissory estoppel, and implied-in-fact contracts.2 7
Despite these exceptions, the vitality of the default rule endures. One
argument against the elimination of the at-will doctrine is judicial
reluctance to become "involved in evaluating employers' discharge
decisions. 20 8 One observer contends that employment-at-will originated in
judicial incompetence to assess the performance of discharged
employees .2 9 The resilience of this perspective provides a basis for the
204. Corbett, supra note 28, at 308.
205. Id. at 311.
206. Collins, supra note 2, at 1.
207. Corbett, supra note 28, at 313-14 (footnotes omitted). Another possible exception is
the imposition on employers of an extracontractual duty to investigate before discharging.
See Michael D. Moberly, Negligent Investigation: Arizona's Fourth Exception to the
Employment-At-Will Rule, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 993, 998 (1995); see also Kim Sheehan,
Comment, Has Employment-at-Will Outlived its Usefulness? A Comparison of U.S. and
New Zealand Employment Law, 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 323 (1997) (comparing employment-
at-will to "affirmative rights" granted by New Zealand's labor laws).
208. Corbett, supra note 28, at 317.
209. Morriss, Exploding Myths, supra note 3, at 713, 752-53.
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allegation that the at-will doctrine stands as an impregnable barrier to the
adequate enforcement of anti-discrimination law. 2'0 From that perspective,
one may be excused for concluding that employment-at-will, unless
displaced, precludes anti-discrimination law in general, 21 and § 1981 in
particular, from having any significance. This article's inspection of federal
appellate cases suggests otherwise. It seems clear that most federal
appellate cases, both before Patterson and after the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
unmistakably accept the application of § 1981 to the employment-at-will
relationship. This application extends beyond a simple concern for the
litigant's capability to "make and enforce" a contract. This determination is
driven by, among other things, an unwillingness to vitiate the congressional
purpose which seeks to extend protection to employees who may not be
covered by Title VII. Indeed, the precise language of the statute explicitly
extends to post-formation conduct, including termination.
Furthermore, if Richard Epstein's eloquent defense of freedom of
contract and contract at-will is to be taken seriously, it needs to be
grounded in the notion that the employment relationship is, rather
emphatically, a contract entered into freely by private parties. First, if "any
employment relationship is a contractual one,, 212 the parties "should be
permitted as of right to adopt this form of contract if they so desire.,
213
Second, Epstein treads on shakier ground in asserting that the at-will canon
"should be respected as a rule of construction in response to the perennial
question of gaps in contract language: what term should be implied in the
absence of explicit agreement on the question of duration or grounds for
termination?, 21 4 While defenders of at-will employment oppose statutory
interference with such a relationship on numerous grounds, their principled
defense is not based on the view that there is no contract. On the contrary,
they argue that it is simply a limited contract.
Still, as we have seen, the implication of the default rule raises its own
complications. If the parties have not explicitly agreed to a termination
term, a court is allowed to engage in an interpretation of indefinite
employment grounded in the presumed applicability of the default rule. At
least two possibilities present themselves.2 5 As alluded to earlier, it might
be possible to contend that the default rule is not a term of the contract,
210. Corbett, supra note 28, at 314 n.34 and accompanying text.
211. See Corbett, supra note 28, at 330 ("[I]f the laws are to have any practical
significance, they must displace employment at will to the extent necessary to effectuate the
goals of the laws.").
212. Heriot, supra note 7, at 167.
213. Epstein, supra note 10, at 951.
214. Id.
215. A third possibility is that indefinite employment fails to constitute a contract at all.
See Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co., 133 F. 3d 1025, 1033 (7th Cir. 1998)
(dismissing a § 1981 claim because, among other things, there was never a contract).
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because: (a) it may not have been consented to, or (b) the implied rule is
simply a rule that fails to become part of the contract. If either possibility
is persuasive, it is conceivable that § 1981 remains inapplicable to
discharge because there is no term216 of the contract to modify. On the
other hand, if employment-at-will is a contract, it is precisely because of its
indefinite nature that the default rule enters into the putative agreement. If
so implicated, one can robustly argue that it is a specific term, and if it is,
the explicit parameters of § 1981 render the contract terms (including
termination) modifiable.
Parenthetically, the parties could, through mutual assent, create a
contract which allows for termination-at-will. In such a case discharge is a
term of the contract and uncontroversially becomes alterable by statutory
provisions. Therefore, § 1981 can modify the termination term of the
contract so that employees may sue for wrongful discharge within the
meaning of the statute.
Assuming that this examination of the foregoing possibilities is
completely sound, those who claim that § 1981 remains, and should
remain, inapplicable to all employment-at-will situations must confront the
possibility that such arguments amount to an ideological commitment to at-
will relationships as opposed to a claim that is premised on logic.
Paradoxically, commentators, both in the United States and abroad, who
oppose employment-at-will on the grounds that it "leads to the creation of
forms of oppressive subordination under the disguise of freely chosen
agreements,, 217 and that it fails to constitute a contract at all, must confront
the possibility that arguments premised on the illegitimacy of employment-
at-will as a form of contract218 inescapably establish grounds for the
216. "A term of a contract is that portion of the legal relations resulting from the promise
or set of promises which relates to a particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an
intention to create those relations." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Section 5(2)
(1981). Comment (a) states that agreed terms are the "terms of a promise or agreement...
expressed in the language of the parties or implied in fact from other conduct. Both
language and conduct are to be understood in the light of the circumstances.. . ." Id.
Comment (b) states that:
[m]uch contract law consists of rules which may be varied by agreement of the
parties. Such rules are sometimes stated in terms of presumed intention, and
they may be thought of as implied terms of an agreement. They often rest,
however, on considerations of public policy rather than on manifestation of the
intention of the parties .... [S~uch rules are stated in terms of the operative
facts which make them applicable."
Id.
217. Collins, Market Power, Bureaucratic Power, supra note 2, at 1.
218. See, e.g., PAUL DAvIES & MARK FREEDLAND, KAHN-FREUND'S LABouR AND THE
LAW 18 (1983)(stating that employment is "an act of submission, in its operation it is a
condition of subordination.., however much.., concealed by that indispensable figment
of the legal mind known as the 'contract of employment!"), as cited in Hutchison,
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inapplicability of § 1981 to all "employment-at-will" relationships posited
on the default presumption.21 9 If there is no contract at all, then § 1981
seems clearly inapplicable. If there is an inadequate contractual
relationship it may be difficult to find a term for § 1981 to alter. In reality,
the desire of some observers to respect the freedom of contract "rights" of
individuals predicated on consent, and the inclination of others to question
whether informed consent actually exists in at-will relationships, converge
in a doctrinal morass which calls this form of employment into question,
despite it clear acceptance by post-Gonzalez courts. Contract sufficiency,
grounded in adherence to doctrinal rigor, is thus placed at issue.
In the next subsection I examine this possibility by an example driven
by the intersection of the analysis of one leading proponent of the freedom
of contract, Professor Barnett, and the empirical insight of one leading
critic of employment-at-will, Professor Kim. This example illustrates the
possible doctrinal impediments to clarity regarding the meaning of
contractual sufficiency in at-will relationships that have previously been
alluded to in more general terms.
B. Doctrinal Concerns Grounded in Default Rule Presumption:
Professor Barnett's Consent-based Contract Regime in the Mirror of
Professor Kim's Empirical Research
If employment-at-will is the default rule, and if the "presence of
consent to be legally bound is essential to justify the legal enforcement of
any default rules,, 220 doctrinal issues, generated by the possible absence of
informed consent, may emerge. Specifically, if a contract consists of
enforceable promises, as Professor Barnett lucidly suggests, and if we seek
to "distinguish between enforceable and unenforceable promises by looking
to see if the parties to an agreement manifested their intention to create or
alter their legal relations, 2 1 then it is possible to argue that an at-will
relationship fails to meet the contract sufficiency requirement. In order to
understand why this might be so, one must examine Professor Kim's
analysis of worker perceptions and knowledge of legal protection against
termination in an at-will world. If workers fall to have satisfactory
knowledge about the absence of legal protection that they possess, as
Professor Kim contends,222 they cannot give the informed consent
Subordinate or Independent, Status or Contract, supra note 12, at 58 n.15.
219. Even when employment-at-will arises out of the explicit consent of the parties,
some might argue its illegitimacy because of the presumed inequality of bargaining power.
220. Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 827 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, The Sound of Silence].
221. Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1022, 1027 (1992) [hereinafter Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise].
222. Professor Kim focuses most of her criticism toward efficiency arguments, which
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necessary to apply the default rule of employment-at-will. 223 It may be
difficult to assert that workers have, in general, manifested an intention to
be legally bound by a rule of which they may be unaware.224 Thus, there
may not be a contract term with respect to duration. If that is true, it is
difficult to conceive how § 1981 alters what is arguably absent from the
agreement. Furthermore, Professor Barnett affirms that a consent-based
contract law regime may be incompatible with gap-filling terms that are
often implied-in-law. Such terms may be implied on grounds of principle
allegedly favor the at-will rule. She argues that "the at-will rule draws force from the
prevalence of at-will contracts in the real world and the faith that the observed market
outcome reflects an efficient bargaining process." Kim, supra note 6, at 147. She asserts
that this faith, "rests on a number of assumptions, including the assumption that workers
have full information, or at least sufficient information to protect their own best interests in
the contracting process." Id. If her study is verifiable and replicable, it may cast doubt on
that assumption. Her study indicates that workers overestimate their legal rights and thus,
believe that the law provides greater protection against unjust discharge than it does. Id.
Professor Kim then states that:
[r]ather than assuming that both employer and employee act "in full possession
of their faculties and their own interests," the model of the labor market - at
least as to job security terms - must take into account that at least one of the
parties is likely seriously misinformed about the background rules against which
bargaining takes place.
Id. (quoting Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and
Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1098 (1989)).
If this analysis is persuasive, then one could question whether there was any intent by
employees to be bound. Without such intent, and consistent with consent theory of contract
law, then one might question whether there is adequate contractual sufficiency to sustain a §
1981 claim of discriminatory discharge. For a more complete discussion of the consent
theory of contract law, see Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as a Promise, supra note
221, at 1027-30; see also Randy Barnett, The Sound of Silence, supra note 220, at 821
(discussing how contracts are often incomplete due to lack of knowledge and interest of the
parties). For an expanded discussion, see infra note 207.
There may be reason to doubt Professor Kim's conclusions. First, her empirical data
is based on a survey of 330 unemployed workers. It is possible that such a group fails to
typify a representative cross section of workers who are currently employed. Second,
worker perceptions may reflect the actual practice of most employers as opposed to the legal
rights of employers. On the latter point see POSNER, supra note 21, at 358 and
accompanying text (discussing the market forces that cause employers to treat employees
fairly).
223. For an argument in favor of employment-at-will, premised at least in part on
efficiency, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 10, at 951-76. In addition to the efficiency test, he
offers two additional arguments in support of at-will arrangements: intrinsic fairness and
distributional consequences. Id.
224. This might be seen as a special variant of the notion that all contracts are, by
necessity, incomplete to some degree. The inevitability of incompleteness reflects ... both
out "relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative indeterminancy of aim. These two causes
of contractual incompleteness reflect in turn two fundamental problems addressed by liberal
principles of justice: the problems of knowledge and of interest. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence, supra note 220, at 823.
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or policy, rather than consent, and amount to coercive imposition on a party
or parties "who have not.., consented to its imposition."225 If this view is
persuasive, once again, it may be doubtful that there is a term of the
contract to modify. Professor Barnett concedes that under a contract
regime, which operates functionally on grounds of consent, default rules
may be compatible with consent, only when subjected to imperative
caveats. He avers: (a) that under certain circumstances a decision to remain
silent is sufficient to permit the default rules to operate as an expression of
consent226 and (b) that "even when parties cannot be said to have consented
by their silence to the enforcement of particular default rules, enforcement
may still be justified on grounds of consent when default rules are chosen
to reflect the commonsense or conventional understanding of most
parties. ,
227
Whatever the value of this approach, it seems dependent, among other
things: on the presence of low information costs in learning the content of
default rules, on low costs in contracting around them, and on the notion
that default rules reflect the parties' shared tacit assumptions. 228 While this
summary fails to capture the complete elegance of Barnett's theory, if his
overall analysis remains sound and if at-will employment as a default rule
is implicated by his contentions,229 it leads to problematic conclusions when
compared with Professor Kim's empirical research. Workers apparently
lack sufficient knowledge about the default rule, and their commonsense
225. Id. at 822-23 and accompanying text.
226. Id. at 827. According to Barnett:
[t]he institution of contract is invoked by the manifestation of intention to be
legally bound. Without this threshold manifestation of consent, there is no
justification for enforcing contractual obligations. So long as the costs of
learning the content of default rules and of contracting around them are
sufficiently low, silence by the parties in the face of a default rule can constitute
consent to its imposition.
Id. at 897.
227. Id. at 827. Barnett avers that:
[c]onventionalist default rules bring objective manifestations and subjective
assent closer together in two ways: (a) they capture the meaning of the parties'
shared tacit assumptions so that enforcement is more likely to reflect the
subjective agreement of the parties, and (b) they act as penalty defaults by
reducing the instance of subjective disagreements that may arise between
rational parties with asymmetric knowledge of the legal background rules.
Id. at 897.
228. Id.
229. Barnett, among others things, asserts that: (1) the existence of consent to be legally
bound is essential in order to justify the legal enforcement of default rule; and (2) nested
within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates to justify the selection
of particular default rules. Id. at 827. If this contention is valid, one wonders if a worker's
consent in accepting indefinite-term employment acts in any way to confirm the selection of
the default rule.
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understanding supports the belief that other rules which constrain the
employer's powers of discharge are in play. Her research suggests that the
costs of learning the default rule may be high, that the price of contracting
around a rule they are unaware of also may be high, and that the at-will
default rule fails to reflect their tacit assumptions. Since consent to be
legally bound is essential to the legal enforcement of default rules, the
absence of such consent suggests that there is in fact no justifiable default
rule to enforce.20 Without a default rule, there is no employment duration
term available for § 1981 to alter. More controversially, one could also
argue that since the default rule is no longer available to impute the
duration of the putative agreement, then the employee is without a contract
at all because duration is an essential term. Without a contract, §1981 is
clearly inapplicable. While there may be an answer, the complete
resolution of this debate exceeds the scope of this enterprise. Ironically,
the research and analysis of an employment-at-will critic may potentially
converge with the analysis of a freedom of contract advocate and they may
jointly undermine the viability of a § 1981 claim and thus revitalize the
skepticism exhibited by Gonzalez and the Second Circuit district courts
concerning the viability of § 1981 claims within the employment-at-will
context.
While many, and perhaps most, courts may be disinclined to engage in
a transparently elegant concern for the metaphysical state of default rules,
they may be inclined to accept that employment-at-will constitutes a
contract with modifiable terms. Given the seeming acceptance and
expansion of public policy exceptions to employment-at-will, and given the
federal appellate court's acceptance of the public policy purpose of § 1981,
employment-at-will may plausibly be varied by the statute. When courts
reach this conclusion, they are unlikely to find that the parties to the
agreement are startled by that determination. Very likely, such a position
mirrors the expectations of the parties, if of course, they have any
expectations concerning the applicability of § 1981. Moreover, as one
judge eloquently avers, 23' when courts interpret § 1981, they should be
aware that they are not acting in a vacuum; history is also present. It is
possible that the original purpose, and the subsequent amendments to §
1981, were aimed at remedying the effects of post-Civil War discrimination
and include, at least implicitly, the congressional intent to eradicate
230. One can, perhaps incompletely, analogize this situation to standard form contracts
as discussed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Section 211 cmt. f (1979), which
indicates that parties are not bound to unknown terms within a contract if they are beyond
the reasonable expectation of the parties.
231. Wilmer v. Tenn. Eastman Co., 919 F.2d 1160, 1164 (6th Cir. 1990) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
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discrimination in employment. On the other hand, clarity would be
enhanced by yet another congressional amendment, which would explicitly
state that employment-at-will is a contract within the meaning of § 1981
and all of its terms including default terms, such as discharge, are alterable
by § 1981. If Congress fails to act, then it is possible that the United States
Supreme Court will refuse to accept, or will otherwise limit, the application
of § 1981 to at-will employment. That possibility may breathe life into
Corbett's pessimistic, and perhaps overblown, assertion that anti-
discrimination law is persistently subject to subordination by the at-will
ideology of the federal courts.z3
V. CONCLUSION
The notion of default rules as gap-filling may constitute a distraction
from the notion of "consent as the basis of contractual obligation. " 2M This
implication of employment-at-will means that the default rule must interact
with anti-discrimination law generally and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in particular.
While Patterson strove to cabin § 1981 within the "make and enforce
contracts" framework, that view was effectively muted by Congress. The
efficacy of the congressional effort to broaden the section has been placed
in issue by both the Seventh Circuit's dicta that an employee at-will fails to
have any contractual rights regarding the term of her employment and,
accordingly, cannot be discriminated against with respect to either layoff or
termination, and by the district court opinions in the Second Circuit which
expressly hold that employment-at-will fails to constitute a contract or a
contractual relationship for purposes of § 1981. While this skepticism has
not been accepted by any of the federal appeals courts which have squarely
determined this issue since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
knotty doctrinal issues still remain. While the majority of federal appellate
courts that have confronted § 1981 and employment-at-will prior to
Patterson seemed to accept the application of §1981 to employment-at-
will, including discharge, there is no Second Circuit opinion which
conclusively concurs. 25 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
not yet reconsidered this issue since Patterson. Indeed, most federal
232. See id. (stating that Patterson does not apply to a § 1981 claim for discriminatory
discharge).
233. Corbett, supra note 28, at 332-58. Corbett directs most of his criticism at the United
States Supreme Court.
234. Barnett, The Sound of Silence, supra note 220, at 822.
235. A Second Circuit opinion issued in 1987 held a discriminatory discharge action
subject to § 1981. See Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1987)
(stating that a former employee established a prima facie case for racially discriminatory
discharge under § 1981). However, no definite period of employment was adduced and
employment-at-will, as a presumptive default rule, was not discussed.
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circuits have not had the opportunity to consider the implications of
Gonzalez. Accordingly, the assertion that federal court jurisprudence
constitutes an impregnable bulwark against anti-discrimination law in
general, has, in the context of recent § 1981 litigation, thus far been
eviscerated. Rightly or wrongly, employment-at-will has proved
sufficiently elastic to accommodate the verve of the default rule and the
aim of anti-discrimination law. On the other hand, as the brief and
preliminary exegesis of the doctrine of informed consent indicates, and as
the discussion of the incipient debate among the federal appellate courts
and specifically within the Second Circuit implies, complex doctrinal
issues endure which may provide a "core of certainty" but give rise to a
"penumbra of doubt. ,,26
While doctrinal issues may linger, given both pre-Patterson and post-
1991 Civil Rights Act jurisprudence, and the expanding number of
exceptions to employment at-will, I conclude, independently of whether
such developments can be justified or assailed and principally on the basis
of conventional analyses, that the terms and conditions of the employment-
at-will relationship, including discharge, are alterable, and should be
alterable by § 1981. Whether this conclusion is sustainable on largely
normative grounds, is a question best left for others.
236. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, 119 (1st ed. 1972), cited in Bix, supra note
57, at 41 n.43.
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